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Loss of Parental Consortium: Why
Children Should Be Compensated
A loss of consortium occurs when a legally recognized relationship
is harmed because of an injury to one member of the relationship.'
The relationships of marriage and between parent and child are
both examples of legally recognized relationships that could be harmed
by a serious injury to a member.2 In a loss of consortium action,
the damages usually include compensation for loss of support, ser-
vices, love, companionship, affection, society, solace, and sexual rela-
tions between the husband and wife. 3 Although several American
jurisdictions now recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium
in the parent-child context,4 the California Supreme Court still limits
the cause of action to the husband-wife relationship. 5
The loss to a child of the companionship and affection of a parent
is very similar to that suffered by a spouse in the context of spousal
consortium.6 In fact, the loss suffered by a child may be even more
serious because of the possibility of diminished psychological growth
potential in the parentally deprived child.7 Psychological studies' have
discovered that a significant percentage of psycho-therapy patients9
I. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 385-86, 525 P.2d 669,
670-71, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 766-67 (1974) (husband of plaintiff partially paralyzed in one arm and
totally paralyzed below midpoint of chest).
2. See, e.g., id. (wife brings loss of consortium action because of negligent injuries to
her husband); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 444-45, 563 P.2d 858, 860-61, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 304-05 (1977) (children bring action for loss of parental consortium resulting
from negligently inflicted injuries to their mother); Nix v. Preformed Line Products Co., 170
Cal. App. 3d 975, 976-77, 216 Cal. Rptr. 581, 581-82 (1985).
3. See Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 443, 563 P.2d at 860, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (court discusses
elements of loss of consortium). Id. at 445, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (each
plaintiff child requested $100,000 in damages for the loss of parental consortium).
4. See infra notes 138-85 and accompanying text (discussion of cases in other jurisdic-
tions permitting recovery for loss of parental consortium).
5. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (court rejecting
recognition of a cause of action for loss of parental consortium).
6. See Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Mass. 1980) (in-
terest of the child in the parent's consortium is analogous to that of the husband or wife).
7. See id. The child-parent relationship is no less significant than that of the husband-
wife. Id.
8. See Psychological Problems and Parental Loss, 113 Scm. NEws 21 (1978). Parental
loss is one common thread among people who recieve psycho-therapy. Parental loss was de-
fined as either death or separation of one month or longer due to injury or illness. Id. See
also Roy, Specificity of Risk Factors for Depression, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 961 (1981) (early
parental loss is a contributing factor in adult depression).
9. Psychological Problems and Parental Loss, 113 Sci. NEws 21 (1978) (70% of the pa-
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had suffered some form of parental loss by age twelve.' 0 This research
concluded that premature parental loss is a significant factor in the
development of neurosis." In many instances, the loss of parental
consortium causes an arrest in the emotional development in a child. 2
Although parental loss may not be the sole cause of emotional prob-
lems in all instances, the loss may be a preexisting condition that
contributes to the development of neurosis.3
Although the harm that children may suffer as a result of a loss
of parental consortium is substantial, recovery in tort presently is not
allowed in California. " In Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.,'" the
California Supreme Court held that no cause of action exists for loss
of parental consortium.' 6 No court in California has deviated from
the Borer decision.' 7 One California appellate court, however, recently
has questioned the current validity of the Borer decision.' 8
In Nix v. Preformed Line Products, Co.,' 9 a California court of
appeal affirmed a trial court decision which dismissed an action for
loss of parental consortium. 20 Although the appellate court denied
a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, that court ques-
tioned the present validity of certain aspects of the Borer decision.2
The Nix court gave several reasons for questioning Borer.2 First, a
significant trend in decisions in other jurisdictions favors recovery for
loss of parental consortium.23 Second, the general expansion of tort
tients in the study had a parental loss in childhood). Parental loss was defined as either death
or separation of one month or longer due to injury or illness. Id.
10. Id. The remaining patients all had at least one parent which had suffered a parental
loss in childhood. Id.
11. Id. BLAKISTON'S, GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 909 (4th ed. 1979) (definition of neurosis).
In psychiatry, neurosis is one of the two major categories of emotional maladjustments, classified
according to the predominant symptom or defense mechanism. Anxiety is the chief symptom,
and though no gross disorganization of personality in relation to external reality exists, some
impairment of thinking and judgment may occur. A neurosis usually represents an attempt
at resolving unconscious emotional conflicts in a way that diminishes the individuals effec-
tiveness in living. Id.
12. Psychological Problems and Parental Loss, 113 Sci. NEws 21 (1978).
13. Id. See Roy, supra note 8, at 961 (either death or separation due to serious injury).
14. See Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (court denying
a cause of action for loss of parental consortium).
15. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302.
16. 19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
17. See Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
18. Id. at 985, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
19. 170 Cal. App. 3d 975, 216 Cal. Rptr. 581.
20. Id. at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
21. Id.
22. Id. See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying text.
23. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 584. See infra notes 138-85 and ac-
companying text.,
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law to allow recovery in cases involving nonpecuniary and intangible
injuries and the commentary favoring recovery for loss of parental
consortium have also helped to undermine the foundations of Borer.2 '
Finally, the Nix court stated that the support that the dissent of Justice
Mosk in Borer has received in other jurisdictions calls for a review
of Borer.25 The Nix court nevertheless felt compelled to follow Borer,
concluding that no cause of action exists for loss of parental consor-
tium.26 The Nix court, however, called for the California Supreme
Court to review and either modify or overrule the Borer decision.27
This comment will examine the theory of loss of consortium 2 and
the application of that theory in California.29 In addition, this com-
ment will discuss Borer0 and the recent California decisions that under-
mine the reasons for denial of recovery for loss of parental consor-
tium.3' The decisions of other jurisdictions concerning loss of paren-
tal consortium also will be explored.32 Finally, this comment will con-
clude that Borer should either be modified or overruled to allow
recovery for loss of parental consortium in California.33 The starting
point of this discussion must be a short history of loss of consortium
in American courts.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF Loss OF CONSORTIUM
At common law, under the doctrine of paterfamilias," any injuries
to the family were injuries to the father.3 5 Only the father could bring
24. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88. See infra notes 226-37 and
accompanying text.
25. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 584, 588 (discussion of refutation
of the allegations of the majority opinion by Justice Mosk in the Borer dissent by Nix court);
see Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 452-61, 563 P.2d at 866-71, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310-15; see infra notes
247-49 and accompanying text.
26. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
27. Id.
28. See infra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 52-126 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 91-125 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text. See also Diamond, Dillon v. Legg
Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible
Injuries, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 477, 497-98 (1984).
32. See Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270 (Iowa 1981); Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695;
Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. 1981); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691
P.2d 190, 193 (Wash. 1984); Theama By Bichler v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 522
(Wis. 1984); see infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
33. See generally Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (Borer is ripe for
review).
34. See Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 692 (definition of paterfamilias).
35. Id. at 692-93.
We may observe that, in these relative injuries (i.e., injuries to the master-servant,
husband-wife, and parent-child relationships), notice is only taken of the wrong done
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actions or recover damages for personal injuries to the wife or the
children.16 The wife and children had no legal existence independent
of the father."
The action for loss of spousal consortium developed from the actions
that the husband was entitled to maintain against those who invaded
the conjugal relationship by adultery or a similar act.3" The theory
behind these claims was that invasion of the conjugal relationship
deprived the husband of the household and other services that the
wife owed to the husband.3 9 Subsequently, the grounds for a loss of
consortium action were broadened to include the loss of the society
of the wife and the impairment of sexual relations.4"
Eventually, courts abandoned the requirement that the defendant
infringe upon the marital relation by adultery or a similar act before
a loss of consortium action could be maintained.4' The husband also
was allowed to recover against a defendant for intentional or negligent
torts inflicted on the wife." Although the husband was able to recover
for injuries to the wife, the wife had no cause of action analogous
to that of the husband. ' -
When married women's acts were passed in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury," women became competent to sue in their own names for per-
sonal injury and could retain the proceeds from those actions.4" Many
to the superior of the parties related, by the breach and dissolution of either the
relation itself, or at least the advantages accruing therefrom; while the loss of the
inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for which may be this:
that the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of
the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore
the inferior can suffer no loss or injury.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 142-43 (1768).
36. Id. (historical discussion of loss of consortium); See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
142-43 (1768) (discussion of loss of consortium actions).
37. See Acuff v. Schmit, 78 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Iowa 1956) (discussion of loss of consor-
tiuin at common law). "[A]t common law the husband and wife were considered as one, and
he was the one..." Id. See also Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 588, 525 P.2d at 672, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 768.
38. Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Mass. 1973) (originally the invasion
was criminal conversation with or abduction of the wife); Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123,
124-25 (1883).
39. Diaz, 302 N.E.2d at 556. The action was similar to that of a master for the enticement
of a servant. Id. See Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 263 (2nd Cir. 1963).
40. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 124, at 873 (4th ed. 1971). Emphasis gradually shifted away
from loss of services or earning capacity as more intangible elements of spousal relationships
became recognized as grounds for a loss of consortium. Id.
41. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 124, at 873 (4th ed. 1971). See Kelly v. New York, 46 N.E.
1063, 1063-64 (N.Y. 1897); see generally Diaz, 302 N.E.2d at 556 (historical discussion of cases
concerning loss of consortium).
42. Diaz, 302 N.E.2d at 556.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 577 (historical discussion of women's acts).
45. See id. (consortium loss caused by negligent injury not actionable).
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courts, however, were slow accepting the new position of women in
society and consequently refused to allow the wife to recover for the
loss of consortium. 6Eventually, however, many jurisdictions began
to permit a wife to recover for a loss of spousal consortium.17
At the present time, a majority of jurisdictions, including Califor-
nia,4" permit both spouses to recover for loss of consortium. 9 Some
jurisdictions additionally have extended recovery for loss of consor-
tium to the parent-child relationship."0 The historical development of
loss of consortium in California has paralleled that of other jurisdic-
tions."5
A. Loss of Consortium in California
Early California cases on loss of consortium permitted the husband,
but not the wife, to recover for loss of spousal consortium.5 2 The
California Supreme Court first addressed whether to extend or deny
the loss of consortium action to the wife in 1958 in Deshotel v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co." In Deshotel, the plain-
tiff wife sued the defendant railway company, alleging that the in-
juries to her husband resulted in a denial of his care, protection, con-
sideration, companionship, aid, and society.5 4 Because of these losses,
the wife claimed that she had been damaged in the sum of $100,000."
In denying the plaintiff wife recovery, the court discussed four policy
considerations.5 6 First, the overwhelming weight of authority in other
jurisdictions supported the denial of a recovery for the loss of con-
sortium damages to the wife in the event that the husband was seriously
injured." Second, departure from a well settled rule of common law
such as denial of recovery by the wife for a loss of spousal consor-
46. See id.
47. See Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 390-91 n.5, 525 P.2d at 673 n.5, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 769
n.5 (list of states permitting recovery for loss of spousal consortium).
48. Id.
49. Id. (list of states permitting recovery for loss of spousal consortium).
50. See infra notes 140-86 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 53-126 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 256, 288 P.2d 1003, 1009 (1955).
53. Deshotel v. Atchison T. & S. Fe R.R. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 664-67, 328 P.2d 449,
449-52 (1958) (issue one of first impression in California).
54. Id. at 665, 328 P.2d at 449.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 665-69, 328 P.2d at 449-52 (1958) (discussion of policy reasons for denying
a wife the right to recover damages for loss of consortium: multiplicity of damages, intangibil-
ity of injuries, possibility of double recovery, and lack of precedential support).
57. Id. at 666, 328 P.2d at 450. The reason that recovery was denied was that the wife
did not suffer a compensable damage rather than the archaic notion that a woman could not
sue in her own name. Id. See Smith v. Nicholas Building Co., 112 N.E. 204, 206 (Ohio 1915).
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tium should be left to the legislature."8 Third, the speculative nature
of the damages for injuries to things such as companionship, love,
and society made their monetary value difficult to determine, thus
making the determination of a specific amount for an award nearly
impossible. s9 Finally, great difficulty existed in determining what types
of claims should be upheld.6" For example, brother-sister, grandparent-
grandchild, and parent-child relationships are similar to the husband-
wife relationship and arguably should also provide a basis for a loss
of consortium action. 61
The Deshotel court denied the cause of action for loss of consor-
tium to a wife. 62 The court, however, specifically refused to decide
whether precedent permitting a husband recovery for loss of copsor-
tium damages stemming from tortious injury to the wife under prece-
dent should also have been rejected. 63 This issue was addressed in
West v. City of San Diego.64
In 1960, the California Supreme Court in West denied the right
of a husband to recover for a loss of spousal consortium.6" The reasons
for the West decision were nearly identical to those put forward to
support the Deshotel decision. 66 The West court, however, could not
discuss the same precedents against permitting recovery from other
states because many other states then permitted a husband to recover
for a loss of consortium resulting from tortious injury to the wife.67
The West court thought that allowing the husband and not the wife
to recover for a loss of consortium would be inequitable, and would
ignore the modern view that the wife is not in a subservient position
58. Deshotel, 50 Cal. 2d at 668, 328 P.2d at 451.
59. Id. at 667, 328 P.2d at 450-51.
60. Id. at 667-68, 328 P.2d at 451.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 668, 328 P.2d 451.
63. Id.
64. West v. City of San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 477, 353 P.2d 929, 934, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289,
294 (1960).
65. Id.
66. Compare West, 54 Cal. 2d at 475-78, 353 P.2d at 932-34, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 292-94 (loss
of consortium recovery denied to a husband because of the inequity of allowing a husband
and not a wife to recover for loss of consortium, the danger of double recovery, the indirect-
ness of the damages, the difficulty of determining a monetary award, and the difficulty of
drawing a line with respect to permitting other close relations recovery) with Deshotel, 50 Cal.
2d at 666-69, 328 P.2d at 449-52 (loss of consortium recovery denied to a wife because of
the lack of precedential support, the danger of double recovery, the indirectness of the damages,
the difficulty of determining a monetary award, and the difficulty of drawing a line with respect
to permitting other close relations recovery).
67. Compare West, 54 Cal. 2d at 476-77, 353 P.2d at 933, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (a number
of American jurisdictions follow the common law rule of permitting the husband and not the
wife recovery for loss of consortium) with Deshotel, 50 Cal. 2d at 666-69, 328 P.2d at 449.52
(the vast majority of American jurisdictions deny the wife recovery for loss of consortium).
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in the marital relationship. 8 Thus, California denied both the hus-
band and the wife recovery for loss of consortium. Deshotel and West
were followed in California until 1974, when both cases were over-
ruled.
69
In 1974, the California Supreme Court decided Rodriguez v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., which explicitly overruled both Deshotel and
West, thereby permitting recovery for loss of consortium by either
spouse. 70 The husband of the plaintiff in Rodriguez was totally
paralyzed below the midpoint of his chest, and partially paralyzed
in one arm as a result of the negligence of the defendant. 7' The
Rodriguez court rejected the policy foundations of the Deshotel deci-
sions by concluding that Deshotel merely invented policy reasons to
support the continued denial of recovery for a loss of spousal consor-
tium by a wife."
First, the Rodriguez court noted that Deshotel relied heavily upon
the weight of authority at the time of the decisions.73 The Rodriguez
court found that since Deshotel and West were decided, the weight
of authority on the issue of loss of consortium had shifted from a
majority of jurisdictions denying recovery for loss of consortium
damages by a wife, to a majority of jurisdictions allowing recovery.74
Second, the Rodriguez court noted that another reason for the denial
of recovery for loss of consortium articulated by Deshotel was that
changing well settled rules of common law was the job of the legislature
rather than the courts. 75 The Rodriguez court stated that this policy
was untenable because the courts are the primary instruments of evolu-
tion in the common law system, and that whenever an old rule of
common law is found to be unsound or unsuited to present condi-
tions, the rule should be set aside and a new rule declared by the
courts. 7' Third, the Rodriguez court rejected the arguments made in
68. West, 54 Cal. 2d at 477, 353 P.2d at 934, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
69. See Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (overruling
West and Deshoteb.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 385-87, 525 P.2d at 670-71, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67.
72. Id. at 388-89, 525 P.2d at 672-73, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69. The denial of loss of
consortium damages for the wife continued after the original reasons for the rule had ceased. Id.
73. Id. at 389-92, 525 P.2d at 673-74, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70. The precedential value
of Deshotel is not only undermined, but destroyed. Id. See Deshotel, 50 Cal. 2d at 665-66,
328 P.2d at 449-50 (the vast majority of American jurisdictions deny the wife recovery for
loss of consortium).
74. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 389-93, 525 P.2d at 672-75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 769-71.
75. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 394, 525 P.2d at 676-77, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73; see Deshotel,
50 Cal. 2d at 668, 328 P.2d at 451.
76. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 394, 525 P.2d at 676-77, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73. See also
People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d 893, 897, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (1964); Katz
v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 123-24, 74 P. 766, 767-68 (1904).
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Deshotel that the monetary value of companionship, love, and society
is too speculative.17 The court found that several decisions after
Deshotel have permitted recovery for intangible losses even though
some of those damages are somewhat speculative 7  and, in addition,
pointed out that juries are capable of determining the appropriate
recovery in cases of intangible loss." The court concluded that the
speculative nature of the damages for loss of consortium could not
support a denial of recovery.80 The final argument made in Deshotel
and rejected in Rodriguez was that the difficulty of deciding what
relationships would be recognized as a basis for the loss of consor-
tium action made recovery for loss of consortium impractical."' The
Rodriguez court stated first that the recognition of the claim of a
spouse rests on equality." The court stated that the possibility that
the law might be urged to go too far in allowing recovery is an un-
acceptable excuse for not moving at all.83
In addition, the court expressly stated that the recovery for loss
of consortium envisioned in Rodriguez was not a double recovery."
The physically injured spouse could recover for lost wages and earn-
ing power, but the other spouse was recovering for the loss of love,
companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, and solace." These
latter interests, said the court, are personal to the spouse seeking
recovery for the loss of consortium. 6
The Rodriguez court found the reasons for denying recovery for
loss of consortium no longer valid.87 Accordingly, that court over-
ruled both Deshotel and West" and permitted recovery for loss of
spousal consortium.8 9 The Rodriguez court, however, did not discuss
whether recovery should be granted for loss of parental consortium. 90
77. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 401, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 777; Deshotel, 50
Cal. 2d at 667, 328 P.2d at 450.
78. Id. See Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 172, 417 P.2d 673, 675, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129,
131 (1966) (determining intangible injuries is precisely what a jury is called upon to do).
79. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 401, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 777 (1974); see
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 752, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (jury called upon
to determine intangible damages in a personal injury action).
80. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 401-02, 525 P.2d at 681-82, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78.
81. Id. See Deshotel, 50 Cal. 2d at 668-69, 328 P.2d at 451-52.
82. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 404, 525 P.2d at 673-74, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779-80.
83. Id. See also Ekalo v. Constructive Services Co., 215 A.2d 1, 6-7 (N.J. 1965).
84. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. App. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
85. Id. at 404-06, 525 P.2d at 673-75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779-81.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 408, 525 P.2d at 676, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (if recovery may be had for one
spouse then the other spouse should recover also).
89. Id.
90. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. App. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782; see Borer,
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B. Loss of Parental Consortium in California
The California Supreme Court did not address the issue of loss
of parental consortium until 1977 in Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.9 '
In Borer, the plaintiff children brought a tort action against the defend-
ant airline, alleging that negligent injuries to their mother deprived
them of services, society, affection, tutelage, guidance, and aid in
personality development. 92 Although the children arguably were in-
jured, the California Supreme Court concluded that children could
not maintain an action for loss of parental consortium.9 3
The Borer court stated that the decision whether to limit liability
for loss of consortium to the husband-wife relationship or to permit
the extension of that action to the parent-child relationship is a ques-
tion of policy rather than law. 94 The court noted that aspects of the
spousal relationship are similar to aspects of the parent-child rela-
tionship and that a significant loss is suffered by a child deprived
of the society and care of a parent. 95 According to the Borer court,
however, any judicial decision must consider more than "logical sym-
metry" and "sympathetic appeal." '96
The Borer court found that several policy arguments existed that
weighed against extension of liability for loss of consortium to the
parent-child relationship.9 7 According to the court, loss of consor-
tium is an intangible, nonpecuniary loss that cannot be compensated
adequately by monetary recovery.9" Damages for loss of parental con-
sortium would be difficult to determine because of the intangible nature
of the loss to the child.99 In addition, the court thought that an
extension of liability to loss of parental consortium would sizeably
increase accident costs.' 00 For instance, the court thought that per-
mitting an action for loss of parental consortium would create prob-
lems of multiplicity of damages not inherent in an action for spousal
consortium.' 0' The right of action would add as many claims to a
19 Cal. 3d at 443-44, 563 P.2d at 860-61, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05 (Rodriguez decision care-
fully avoided resolving whether a child could maintain a cause of action for loss of parental
consortium).
91. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 444, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
92. Id. at 444-45, 563 P.2d at 861-62, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06.
93. Id. at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
94. Id. at 446, 563 P.2d at 861-62, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 746, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (1975)).




101. Id. at 448-49, 563 P.2d at 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08 (citing Russell v. Salem
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personal injury action as the injured parent had minor children, but
the spousal action for loss of consortium could add only a maximum
of one more claim to the action. 2 The Borer court concluded that
the inadequacy of monetary damages, the intangible nature of the
injury and the costs to society of paying damages outweighed any
potential benefits that could be derived from compensating the child.0 3
The Borer court also noted that the action for loss of parental con-
sortium was unsupported by precedent or statute in California or other
jurisdictions. 0 4 At the time Borer was decided, the action for loss
of spousal consortium found support in a majority of other jurisdic-
tions. 05 No jurisdiction, however, permitted a child to recover for
loss of parental consortium in a personal injury action.'0 6
Finally, the Borer court considered whether the denial of an action
for loss of parental consortium in a personal injury action violated
equal protection of the law under the United States and California
Constitutions.'0 7 The California wrongful death statute 08 permitted
a child to recover for the loss of consortium of the deceased parent.'0 9
If the plaintiff children in Borer had a parent who was killed rather
than injured, they would have recovered damages for loss of paren-
tal consortium."10 The plaintiffs argued that this inconsistency in the
law between the wrongful death statute and the common law in
California was inequitable and unconstitutional."' They contended
that no rational basis existed for permitting the child of a negligently
killed parent to recover while denying recovery to the child of a
negligently injured parent." 2
The Borer court found that the question to be considered was
whether the classification rested upon some ground of difference having
Transportation Co., 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972)). Each claim by a child would be entitled to
a separate appraisal of award. Therefore, for every additional child, there would be an addi-
tional claim added to each action. Id.
102. Id. at 449, 563 P.2d at 864, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
103. Id. at 453, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
104. Id. at 449, 563 P.2d at 864, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
105. Id.
106. Id. No state then permitted a child to sue for a loss of parental consortium; a total
of 18 jurisdictions had rejected the cause of action. Id.
107. Id. at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
108. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.
109. Id.; see Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (discussion
of CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377).
110. See Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (children permit-
ted recovery for loss of parental consortium under CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 377); Krouse v.
Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 67-69, 562 P.2d 1025, 1028-29, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866-67 (1977)
(loss of parental consortium permitted under wrongful death statute). See also Griott v. Gamblin,
194 Cal. App. 2d 577, 578-79, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228-30 (1961).
111. See Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
112. Id.
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a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 3 Ap-
plying this test, the court discussed two significant distinctions be-
tween recovery for loss of parental consortium in the wrongful death
context and recovery in the context of a personal injury action."'
First, in a wrongful death action the child is precluded from any
recovery other than loss of consortium, but in a personal injury case,
the child is not without recovery since the parent may recover for
the personal injury, thus indirectly benefiting the child."' Second,
before the statute permitting a child recovery for loss of consortium
in a wrongful death action was enacted, tortfeasors were in a better
position if they killed rather than injured the parent."16 The court
concluded that because of these two differences, the denial of recovery
for loss of consortium to a child whose parent was disabled rested
on a rational basis and withstood constitutional challenge."1
7
Finally, the Borer court denied recovery for a loss of parental con-
sortium as a matter of methodology." ' The court held that permit-
ting recovery for a new cause of action could not be decided on
foreseeability alone, but that the costs of permitting recovery should
be weighed against the benefits of a recovery." 9 If the costs outweigh
the benefits, the new action should not be permitted.' 20 In applying
this balancing test to the facts in Borer, the court admitted the real-
ity and the magnitude of the injury suffered by the plaintiffs, but
concluded that the need to compensate the children of negligently
disabled parents for loss of consortium is outweighed by the policy
reasons supporting the denial of recovery. 121
At the time that Borer was decided, no other jurisdiction permit-
ted recovery for a loss of parental consortium.' 22 Although a few
jurisdictions agree with Borer and deny recovery for loss of parental
consortium,' 23 other jurisdictions have begun a trend toward permit-
113. Id. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (discussion of standard for deter-
mining whether a state law is unconstitutional); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920).
114. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
115. Id. at 452, 563 P.2d at 865-66, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
116. Id. at 452-55, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
117. Id. at 453, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
118. Id. The Court admitted that children need the love, affection, society, and guidance
of their parents, and that any injury which diminishes the ability of the parent to meet those
needs is a tragedy which harms all members of the community. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The court did not doubt the reality and magnitude of the injury. Id.
122. Id. at 449, 563 P.2d at 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08; Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at
981, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
123. Zorzos v. Rosen By and Through Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1985); Salin v.
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ting recovery.' 21 In addition, Justice Mosk's strong dissent in Borer,
which refuted the contentions of the majority point by point, has
received recognition in jurisdictions that permit a child to recover for
a loss of parental consortium.' 25
DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS CONCERNING Loss OF PAREN-
TAL CONSORTIUM
As noted, at the time that Borer was decided, no other Americanjurisdiction permitted recovery for loss of parental consortium.' 26 Since
Borer, several other jurisdictions have permitted this extension of the
traditional loss of consortium action. '21 Some jurisdictions, however,
have concurred with the Borer conclusions.' 21 In analyzing the sound-
ness of Borer today, this comment will review the reasoning of courts
from other jurisdictions beginning with an analysis of decisions agreeing
with Borer. 29
A. Decisions Denying Recovery for Loss of Parental
Consortium
although a recognizable trend exists among American courts to allow
recovery for loss of parental consortium, 3 several jurisdictions recently
considering the issue have denied recovery to the child.' One of the
primary reasons advanced by courts denying the cause of action is
that extension of the law should be made by the legislature.' 3 2 The
theory advanced in these cases was that an expansion of liability was
Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 737-38 (Minn. 1982); Dengelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 449N.E.2d 406, 407-08 (N.Y. 1983); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266, 267 (N.D. 1980); Norwest
v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 324 (Or. 1982); see infra notes 131-37
and accompanying text (discussion of decisions denying recovery for loss of parental consortium).124. Welt!, 311 N.W.2d at 270; Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695; Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 426;Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193; Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 522; see infra notes 140-73 and accompany-
ing text.
125. See generally Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 453-60, 563 P.2d 866-71, 138 Cal. Rptr. 310-15(Justice Mosk dissenting); Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 270; Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695; Berger, 303N.W.2d at 426; Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193; Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 522; see infra notes 140-73
and accompanying text.
126. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 449, 563 P.2d at 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08; Nix, 170
Cal. App. 3d at 981, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
127. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Norwest, 652 P.2d at 324; Morgel, 290 N.W.2d at 267.
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in the realm of social policy and that deciding social policy was the
job of the legislature rather than the courts.'33
Other jurisdictions deny recovery for loss of parental consortium
as a means of limiting liability.'34 These courts thought that they had
a responsibility to draw a line on the extension of liability.'" They
concluded that the line limiting liability for the loss of consortium
should be drawn at the children.' 36 While the courts denying recovery
for loss of parental consortium developed various policy arguments
to justify their positions, the courts permitting recovery refuted these
arguments and in addition discussed. reasons why recovery should be
permitted. 37
B. Decisions Permitting Recovery for Loss of Parental
Consortium
The cases which extend liability for loss of consortium to the parent-
child relationship are more persuasive than the cases denying recovery.
These cases extend liability to new areas in response to observed
changes in societal views rather than keeping old limits that are not
in line with current societal opinions.'38 The cases permitting recovery
for loss of parental consortium also refute the logic employed by the
courts denying the cause of action.'3 9
The cause of action for loss of parental consortium was first
recognized in 1980 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussets
in the case of Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. 4 ' TheoFer-
133. See, e.g., Norwest, 652 P.2d at 324; Morgel, 290 N.W.2d at 267. See contra, e.g.,
Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 882, 395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847 (the courts should not abdicate
responsibility for the upkeep of the common law); Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.
3d 58, 62-63, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506-07 (1983) (the development of the common law is deter-
mined by the needs of society); Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 266-68 (an action for loss of consortium
is a creation of the courts and as such may be changed by the courts); Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d
at 695-96 (in a field left long to the common law, change may well come about from the
same medium); Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 427 (a lack of precedent does not relieve a court of
the responsibility of adjudicating each case on the merits); Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193 (when
courts do not develop new law for changing situations, the courts are abdicationg their respon-
sibility to reform the common law to meet evolving standard of justice); Theama, 344 N.W.2d
at 514 (discussing how the genius of the common law is the ability to adapt to the changes
in society).
134. See, e.g., Zorzos, 467 So. 2d at 307; Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 737-38; Dngelis, 449 N.E.2d
at 407-08; see infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Zorzos, 467 So. 2d at 307; Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 737-38; Dngelis, 449 N.E.2d
at 407-08.
136. See, e.g., Zorzos, 467 So. 2d at 307; Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 737-38; Dngelis, 449 N.E.2d
at 407-08.
137. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
140. 413 N.E.2d at 695.
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riter court stated that minor children have a strong interest in the
society of their parents that is as significant as the interest that spouses
have in the society of one another.'' The court stated that protect-
ing the reasonable expectation of the child in the consortium of the
parent by allowing recovery for loss of parental consortium is ap-
propriate when the parent is negligently injured.'4 2 Additionally, the
court noted that since damages under a wrongful death statute are
available to a child for loss of parental consortium, damages should
be available to a child who suffers a loss of parental consortium from
a tortious injury to the parent.'"3 Addressing the issue of deference
to the Massachusetts Legislature, the court stated that in a field
historically left to the common law, sensible reform may be instituted
by the courts.'" As a prerequisite to recovery for loss of parental
consortium, the Ferriter court held that the child must have been
dependent upon the parent both economically and emotionally. 41
Similar arguments were developed by the Supreme Court of Michigan,
the next court to permit recovery for loss of parental consortium. 4 6
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized a cause of action
for loss of parental consortium in Berger v. Weber. 'W The Berger
court concluded that the lack of precedent supporting loss of paren-
tal consortium did not relieve the court of the responsibility to decide
the issue on the merits.' The court then decided that because the
loss of parental consortium could not be distinguished from the loss
of spousal consortium, a loss of parental consortium also should be
actionable.'4 9 In addressing the issue of increased liability from the
new action, the Berger court found that resulting higher insurance
rates would be justified because immediate compensation of injuries
to the parent-child relationship would allow the child to better func-
tion without emotional handicap, thus benefitting society. 5 0
The Ferriter and Berger cases highlight the social importance of
compensating a child for the loss of society and companionship of
a parent. 5 ' The concern for social policy is not as evident in the
141. Id. at 692.
142. Id. at 695.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 695-96.
145. Id. at 696.
146. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
147. 303 N.W.2d at 426.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 426.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
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other decisions permitting recovery for loss of parental consortium.,52
Other courts have provided recovery for loss of parental consortium
by refuting different policy arguments advanced by courts denying
recovery to the child.
The Iowa Supreme Court recognized the action for loss of paren-
tal consortium in Weitl v. Moes.'" The Weitl court first rejected the
policy arguments used by the Borer court to deny recovery,' 54 and
then discussed the trend toward recognition of certain personal rights
for minor children.' 55 The view that children should enjoy the same
protections and opportunities for legal redress as adults was also men-
tioned in the Weitl opinion.'5 6 The Weitl court found that a child
is damaged when the parent-child relationship is harmed; a separate
award for those losses would both insure that the interests of the
child are protected and that any recovery is used to benefit the child., 7
The court reasoned that if the recovery was not separately allocated,
the parent might have used the money for some purpose other than
the compensation of the injuries of the child.' 5 1
The Weitl court admitted that permitting recovery could lead to
multiplicity of actions and expansion of accident costs because of the
resultant increase of liabilty.' 9 The court concluded, however, that
these difficulties could be cured by limiting the cause of action to
the parent-child relationship, limiting recovery to the minority of the
child, and requiring joinder of the loss of parental consortium claim
to the original personal injury suit of the parent.' 60 The Weitl court
decided that the reasons for permitting recovery for loss of parental
consortium outweighed the problems the action might create.' Other
courts have employed similar balancing tests, but have used slightly
different criteria to achieve the same result.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed recovery for loss of paren-
tal consortium in 1984 in Theama By Bichler v. City of Kenosha.'62
152. See infra notes 153-73 and accompanying text.
153. 311 N.W. at 270.
154. Id. at 267-68.
155. Id. at 268-69. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678,
691-702 (1977); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-14
(1969).
156. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 268-69.
157. Id. at 266-68.
158. Id. at 269.
159. Id. at 270.
160. Id. (the children must join their claim to the action of the injured parent).
161. Id.
162. Theama, 344 N.W. 513, 522.
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The Theama court discussed three main reasons supporting recovery.163
First, the child increasingly is being recognized as a person deserving
of constitutional rights and protection by the courts.' 64 Second, the
great importance of the family unit in modern society makes protec-
tion of the integrity of the unit important.16 Finally, the love, care,
education, and protection of a parent is a necessary contribution to
the complete development of the child.' 66 The Theama court concluded
that the reasons for allowing recovery outweighed the reasons advanced
in Borer for denying recovery.' 67
A slightly different approach was used by the most recent court
to permit recovery for loss of parental consortium.6 8 The Washington
Supreme Court permitted recovery in Ueland V. Reynolds Metal Co.'69
The Ueland court first explained that undue deference to the legislature
on the issue of loss of parental consortium would be an abdication
of the judicial responsibility to reform the common law since loss
of consortium was a creation of the common law rather than the
legislature.' 70 The court then analogized the loss of parental consor-
tium tort recovery to the recovery permitted for loss of parental con-
soitium under a wrongful death statute,' 7 ' and concluded that no dif-
ference existed between the loss of parental love, care, companion-
ship, and guidance by the child in either situation.'72 Furthermore,
the Ueland court explained that permitting a spouse to recover for
loss of consortium while denying a recovery to a child suggested the
false premise that a child is less likely to suffer serious emotional
injury than an adult.' 73
All of the recent decisions concerning loss of parental consortium,
including those denying recovery, have discussed the seriousness of
the injury to the child.'74 The courts that denied recovery thought
that policy considerations, including limitation of liability and deference
to the legislature on social policy issues, were more important than




167. Id. at 522.
168. Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193.
169. 691 P.2d 190.
170. Id. at 193.
171. Id. at 192.
172. Id. at 192-93.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 131-73 and accompanying text (discussion of out of state loss of parental
consortium decisions).
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compensating the injured children.'75 The courts that permit recovery
rejected these policy justifications advanced for the denial of
recovery. 7
6
All of the courts that allowed recovery agreed that because loss
of consortium was an invention of the common law, the courts rather
than the legislature should be the instrument of change. 177 These courts
recognized the procedural difficulties inherent in the loss of parental
consortium action, '7  but discussed remedies to these problems. 79 Most
courts allowing recovery admitted a lack of precedential support for
their decisions,8 0 but still concluded that the rights of a new class
of plaintiffs should be judged on their own merits.' 8 '
The importance of the parent in the growth of the child was also
noted by the courts permitting recovery.' Finally, these courts con-
cluded that the interest of the child is so important that a cause of
action for loss of parental consortium must be recognized8 3 regardless
of any problems inherent in the action. 4 Accordingly, the present
validity of the arguments used to support the denial of recovery in
Borer is currently open to question.
1 5
THE WEAKENED BASIS OF BORER
The California Supreme Court decided Borer v. American Airlines,
Inc. by balancing several policy considerations.'8 6 The detriments of
a recovery for loss of parental consortium were held to outweigh the
benefits of the action.' 7 If the weight initially given to each of the
Borer policy considerations has changed, then the outcome of the Borer
case must be reexamined.' 8
175. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text. Weil, 311 N.W.2d at 270; Ferriter,
413 N.E.2d at 695; Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 426; Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193; Theama, 344 N.W.2d
at 522.
177. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 270; Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695; Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 426;
Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193; Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 522. See supra notes 140-73 and accompany-
ing text (discussion of out of state decisions permitting recovery for loss of parental consortium).
178. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 186-237 and accompanying text (discussion of present validity of Borer).
186. See Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 453, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
187. "[TJaking into account all considerations which bear on this question .... we should
not recognize an action for loss of parental consortium." Id.
188. See id. See also Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 394, 525 P.2d at 676-77, 115 Cal. Rptr.
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The first major policy consideration the Borer court marshalled
against permitting recovery was that a monetary award could not com-
pensate a plaintiff adequately for the loss of parental consortium. 18 9
The reason that monetary compensation was considered inadequate
in Borer was that the damages resulting from loss of consortium were
intangible and therefore could not be measured in monetary terms. 90
Furthermore, no amount of money will enable a child to regain the
companionship and guidance of the injured parent. 19' The same argu-
ment, however, may be raised in the context of spousal consortium. 92
Money cannot truly compensate a wife for the destruction of her
marriage through injury to her husband, but California courts allow
a wife to recover monetary damages 9 ' because, as the Rodriguez court
stated, "[m]oney . . . is the only known means to compensate for
the loss suffered and to symbolize society's recognition that a culpable
wrong... has been done."' 94 The Rodriguez court concluded: "That
the law cannot do enough, in short, is an unacceptable excuse for
not doing anything at all."' 9 Furthermore, spousal loss of consor-
tium is not the only area in which the law recognizes a monetary
award as a legitimate means of compensating a plaintiff for intangi-
ble injuries. 96
The California Supreme Court has held that intangible damages
may be compensated by monetary recovery in numerous situations.,97
For example, pain and suffering damages comprise a major part of
many tort actions, and awards that do not compensate for pain and
at 772-73 (citing 15 Am. JUR. 2D Common Law § 2, at 797).
The nature of the common law requires that each time a rule of law is applied,
it be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and the needs of the
times have not so changed as to make further application of it the instrument of
injustice.
Id.
189. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447, 563 P.2d at 862-63, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d at 676, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
194. Id. at 402, 525 P.2d at 671-72, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78 (citing Millington v. Southeastern
Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. 1968)).
195. Id.
196. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
197. See Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 706 n.8, 669 P.2d 41, 47 n.8, 194
Cal. Rptr 805, 811 n.8 (1983) (recovery permitted for purely psychological damages); Molien
v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 919, 616 P.2d 813, 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 832
(1980) (husband recieved damages for emotional trauma resulting from a doctor erroneously
diagnosing syphilis in his wife); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 731, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72, 74 (1968) (mother received damages for emotional injury resulting from witness-
ing an injury to a child).
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suffering have been held inadequate as a matter of law.' 98 Similarly,
the problems defining the intangible damages involved in a loss of
parental consortium action should not be accorded undue impor-
tance.' 99
In Borer, the California Supreme Court held that the difficulty of
defining intangible damages weighed in favor of denying recovery.2"0
This court, however, at the present time allows loss of consortium
damages to spouses.20 ' In comparing the intangible damages for loss
of spousal consortium with those for loss of parental consortium,
no significant difference appears to exist.2"2 Furthermore, the California
Supreme Court allows measurement of intangible losses in other con-
texts. 20
3
In many decisions, the California Supreme Court found a jury
capable of determining intangible or nonphysical damages. 20 4 Addi-
tionally, loss of consortium damages are determined by a jury in the
context of a wrongful death action.20 5 Therefore, no reasons exist for
preventing a jury from determining loss of parental consortium
damages in a personal injury action. 20 6
Additionally, the Borer court was influenced by the possibility of
a double recovery if the child received compensation for loss of paren-
tal consortium. 20 7 The court reasoned that juries would most likely
add money to the recovery of an injured parent because of the ex-
istence of the children. 208 The appropriate response to this argument
198. See, e.g., Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-93, 500 P.2d 880,
882-83, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858-59 (1972).
199. See infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
200. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 563 P.2d at 862-63, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07.
201. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
202. Compare id. at 402, 525 P.2d at 681-82, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78 (court discussing
intangible nature of loss of spousal consortium damages) with Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447-48,
563, P.2d at 862-63, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07 (court discussing intangible nature of loss of
parental consortium action).
203. See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at 706, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (recovery
permissible for purely psychological damages to a child that witnessed the killing of a parent);
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (husband may receive damages
for emotional trauma resulting from a doctor erroneously diagnosing syphilis in his wife); Krouse,
19 Cal. 3d at 76, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (1977) (recovery permissible
for mental suffering); Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (mother
may receive damages for emotional injury resulting from witnessing an injury to a child).
205. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377; see also Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 62-68, 562 P.2d
at 1022-25, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 863-66.
206. See generally Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 62-68, 562 P.2d at 1022-25, 137 Cal. Rptr. at
863-66 (jury determines damages for loss of parental consortium in a wrongful death action).
207. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 448, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (juries award serious-
ly injured parents more money because of their children).
208. Id.
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is best stated in the Iowa case of Weitl v. Moes, °9 and in the
Massachussetts case of Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.210
Both Weitl and Ferriter discussed possible means to avoid the
possibility of double recovery in an action for loss of parental con-
sortium. 21 The Iowa Supreme Court in Weitl concluded that a jury
informed that the children have an action of their own would feel
no need to compensate the children in the suit brought by the parent,
thus avoiding a double recovery. 1 2 In Ferriter, the Massachussetts
high court reasoned that procedural devices, including mandatory
joinder of actions and appropriate jury instructions, would also reduce
the risk of double recovery. 2'3 The reasoning of these recent deci-
sions lessens the weight that the second Borer policy consideration
would receive in a balancing test.21 4
The next policy argument that the Borer court utilized to argue
against permitting a recovery for loss of parental consortium was the
possibility of multiplicity of actions. 215 Each child that a negligently
injured parent had would add one more claim to a tort action. 6
The Borer court feared that the recognition of a loss of parental con-
sortium action would give rise to numerous law suits arising from
one negligent act.21 7 Justice Mosk's dissent in Borer marshalls per-
suasive statistics to oppose the conclusion of the majority that the
loss of parental consoritum action would greatly multiply the liability
of a tortfeasor. 2 8
Justice Mosk found that while between 77.8% and 89.7% of all
men in this country between the ages of 25 and 65 are married, 46%
of the families in the United States have no minor children and an
additional 19.2% have only one minor child. 21 9 Additionally, only
9.5% of families have three minor children, and the entire class of
families with four or more children comprises 7.4% .220 These pro-
209. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 266-68.
210. Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 694. See also Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 522.
211. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
212. Weitl, 311 N.W. at 266-68. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
213. Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 694. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 563 P.2d at 862-63, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07
(discussion of second policy support for denial of recovery for loss of parental consortium).
215. Id. at 448-49, 563 P.2d at 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 457-58, 563 P.2d at 868-69, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13. See infra notes 219-21
and accompanying text.
219. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 457-58, 563 P.2d at 870-71, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13. See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 42, table 56 (96th ed. 1975).
220. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 457-58, 563 P.2d at 868-69, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13. See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 42, table 56 (96 ed. 1975).
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portions have remained nearly constant over the last twenty-five
years.22 ' Thus, the fear of the Borer court that allowing recovery for
loss of parental consortium would result in a dramatic increase in
the number of lawsuits appears unfounded.
The Borer court also denied recovery because of lack of precedent
for the action. 222 At the time of the Borer decision, no jurisdiction
permitted recovery for loss of parental consortium. 223 Subsequent to
the Borer decision, five other jurisdictions have permitted recovery. 224
These decisions not only create a trend in favor of loss of parental
consortium but also refute most of the reasons given in Borer for
denial of recovery.225
At the time of Borer, the Supreme Court did not allow actions
founded upon purely intangible injury.226 In Borer, the court con-
cluded that Dillon v. Legg227 and subsequent authority support the
decision in Borer to deny a cause of action founded on purely in-
tangible injury. 22 Decisions subsequent to Borer, however, have per-
mitted recovery for purely intangible injury.229 In Molien v. Kaiser,30
the California Supreme Court permitted recovery for the negligent
infliction of emotional or mental distress unaccompanied by physical
injury in a case in which a doctor misdiagnosed syphilis in the wife
of the plaintiff and thus caused the plaintiff emotional damages. 23'
In Hedlund v. Superior Court,23 2 the court permitted a child to recover
for purely mental damages in a case in which the plaintiff child wit-
nessed an injury inflicted on the parent.233
221. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 457-58, 563 P.2d at 868-69, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
222. Id. at 449, 563 P.2d at 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08.
223. Id.
224. Weill, 311 N.W.2d at 270; Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695; Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 426;
Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193; Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 522; See supra notes 140-73 and accompany-
ing text.
225. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
226. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 563 P.2d at 862-63, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07.
227. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (cause of action limited
to a case in which plaintiff suffered physical injury).
228. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 450, 563 P.2d at 864-65, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09; see, e.g.,
Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 77-78, 562 P.2d at 1031-32, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
229. See, e.g., Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at 706 n.8, 669 P.2d at 47 n.8, 194 Cal. Rptr at 811
n.8; Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-30, 194 P.2d at 819-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-39. See Diamond,
supra note 31, at 496-99. By abolishing the physical injury requirement in Molien and Hedlund,
the California Supreme Court undermines the rationale in the earlier Borer v. American Airlines,
Inc., for distinguishing the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress from other torts
giving rise to independent claims for intangible damages. Id.
230. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 916, 194 P.2d at 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
231. Id. at 928-30, 194 P.2d at 819-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-39.
232. Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at 695, 669 P.2d at 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
233. Id. at 706 n.8, 669 P.2d at 47 n.8, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811 n.8. The rule that requires
physical injury as a prerequisite to recovery for mental distress has been abrogated. Id.
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The recent trends in California tort law as well as decisions of other
jurisdictions cast doubt on the significance of the policy considera-
tions originally given in Borer.2 14 Since the relative weights given the
policy considerations for the Borer decision have changed, the out-
come of the balancing test used in Borer may be different today.2 "
Therefore the present validity of the decision may be questioned.23 6
At least one California appellate court has recognized the need to
reevaluate Borer.237
Nix v. Preformed Line Products Co. 238 was a case in which the
father of the plaintiff children was severely injured while working
for a power company when a wooden utility pole broke and caused
him to fall to the ground.239 After the accident, Nix could neither
speak nor take care of himself.2"" The children brought a suit, alleg-
ing that the injuries to their father caused them a loss of consor-
tium. 24I The trial court granted demurrers to the claim without leave
to amend.24 2 Althfough the decision of the trial court was affirmed,
the Nix court noted recent criticism of the Borer decision.243
The Nix court noted a significant trend in other jurisdiciton to allow
the child to recover for loss of parental consortium.24 4 The general
expansion of tort law to allow recovery in cases involving intangible,
nonpecuniary injuries was also discussed in Nix.241 The Nix court
specifically noted that the California Supreme Court no longer re-
quired physical injury as a prerequisite for recovery in psychological
damage action.24 6 In addition, the Nix court noted that commentators
234. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 453, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310 (summary of policy
considerations used to justify denial of recovery for loss of parental consortium).
235. See Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (discussion of problems with
Borer decision).
236. See id. (court questions validity of Borer).
237. See id. at 985-86, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82 (court discussing criticisms and inconsisten-
cies of Borer). See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying text (discussion of Nix).
238. 170 Cal. App. 3d at 975, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 581.




243. Id. at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588. See infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
244. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 585. See Weill, 311 N.W.2d at 270;
Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695; Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 426; Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193; Theama,
344 N.W.2d at 522. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
245. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88. See, e.g., Hedlund, 34 Cal.
3d at 706 n.8, 669 P.2d at 47 n.8, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811 n.8; Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-30,
194 P.2d at 819-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-39.
246. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 985-86, 216 Cal. Rptr. 588. See Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at
706 n.8, 669 P.2d at 47 n.8, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811 n.8 (court permitting recovery for purely
intangible damages); Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-30, 194 P.2d at 819-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-39
(court permitting recovery for purely intangible damages).
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favor recovery in cases involving loss of parental consortium. 27 Finally,
the Nix court mentioned other jurisdictions that haveueen persuaded
by the dissent of Justice Mosk in Borer to permit recovery for loss
of parental consortium.2 8 In light of these criticisms, the Nix court
concluded that the Borer decision had lost validity in recent years.24 9
Nevertheless, the Nix court was required to follow Borer, because
the Borer decision had not been overruled or modified by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court."' While reluctantly following Borer, the Nix court
stated that the time was ripe for the California Supreme Court to
review Borer.211 In view of the need to reconsider Borer, several policy
justifications for permitting recovery for loss of parental consortium
will now be discussed. 252
POLICY REASONS FOR PERMITTING RECOVERY FOR Loss OF PAREN-
TAL CONSORTIUM
The damages to a child who loses the society of a parent are
serious.2 53 Children need the love, affection, society, and guidance
of their parents to mature into adults without emotional handicap.
254
Any injury that diminishes the ability of a parent to meet these needs
harms all members of the community. 25 5 Children have a reasonable
expectation that their interest in the consortium of their parent will
be protected. 25 6 Denying children recovery for damages to these in-
terests ignores the recognition that children should enjoy the same
protections and opportunities for legal redress that adults enjoy.
25 7
In addition, although juries may award extra money to injured
parents with children,25 8 the only way to insure that the children are
247. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588. See Comment, The Supreme
Court of California: Limiting the Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium, 66 CAMF. L. REV.
430-46 (1978); Diamond, supra note 31 at 497-98.
248. Nix, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 981, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 585. No court in California has overruled Borer. Id.
251. Id. at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
252. See infra, notes 253-80 and accompanying text.
253. See Psychological Problems and Parental Loss, supra note 9, at 21 (parental loss is
one common thread among people who recieve psycho-therapy). Parental loss was defined as
either death or separation for one month or longer due to accident or illness. Id. See also
Roy, supra note 8, at 961 (early parental loss a contributing factor in adult depression). Paren-
tal loss was defined as either death or separation for one month or longer due to accident
or illness. Id.
254. Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 426. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
255. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 453, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
256. Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695.
257. Weiti, 311 N.W.2d at 269.
258. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 448, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
compensated for their damages is to grant them a separate recovery. 2 9
Provisions to protect the interests of the child may be made more
easily in a separate award for the damages to the child because the
award is made specifically for the child and is not a mere afterthought
by a jury.2 60 Finally, permitting a child to recover loss of consortium
damages in a wrongful death action and not permitting recovery for
loss of consortium damages in a personal injury action seems extremely
inconsistent. 26'
In either instance, when a child experiences the loss of the affec-
tion and society of a parent, the child is suffering actual psychological
harm.262 At present, however, the child may recover for loss of parental
consortium only in a wrongful death action.263 In general, the goal
of tort law is to compensate victims of negligently caused injury. 264
Denying compensation to the victims of a loss of parental consor-
tium in a personal injury action ignores the serious injury to the
child.265 In addition, recovery for loss of parental consortium in a
personal injury action would make the law more consistent, because
loss of consortium would then be permitted under both the wrongful
death statute and the common law. 266
The other jurisdictions permitting recovery for loss of parental con-
sortium provide excellent examples of the workability of the action
in the common law system. 267 The concerns that the Borer court raised
regarding the action have been responded to successfully by those
jurisdictions allowing recovery for loss of parental consortium.268 These
practical examples of solutions to the problems associated with the
loss of parental consortium action effectively refute the arguments
raised in Borer for denying the existence of the cause of action.2 69
The California Supreme Court has stated that the upkeep of the
259. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 269.
260. Id.
261. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377; Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 269; Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d
at 695; Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193. Contra, Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 451-52, 563 P.2d at 864-66,
138 Cal. Rptr. at 308-10.
262. See supra, notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
263. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 377; see also Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 62-68, 562 P.2d
at 1022-25, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 863-66.
264. Acuff, 78 N.W.2d at 483. "[W]here there is a wrong there must be a remedy .... " Id.
265. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
266. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377; Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 62-68, 562 P.2d at 1022-25,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 863-66 (loss of consortium permitted in wrongful death action); Well, 311
N.W.2d at 269; Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695; Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193.
267. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
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common law is the duty of the courts.27 When an old rule of com-
mon law is found to be unsound or unsuited to present conditions,
the rule should be set aside and a new rule that is sound and that
corresponds to existing conditions should be declared.27' Common law
tort rules that lack current validity have been abrogated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in numerous instances. 272 When a previous Supreme
Court decision is out of line with present conditions, the Supreme
Court should not hesitate to overrule the earlier decision. 273 Because
the weight of the elements of the Borer balancing test have changed,274
Borer is out of step with the present conditions of society.275 Fur-
thermore, important reasons exist for allowing recovery to an injured
child for loss of parental consortium.276
The potential difficulties with allowing recovery for loss of paren-
tal consortium could be avoided by limiting the cause of action to
the minority of the child. 277 Children over sixteen could be required
to prove that they are psychologically dependant on their parents.27
270. People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
271. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 394, 525 P.2d. at 676-77, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 772-75; see,
e.g., Weill, 311 N.W.2d at 266-68 (an action for loss of consortium is a creation of the courts
and therefore may be changed by the courts); Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 695-96 (in a field left
long to the common law, change may come from the same medium); Berger, 303 N.W.2d
at 426 (a lack of precedent does not relieve a court of the responsibility of adjudicating each
case on the merits); Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193 (when courts do not develop new law for chang-
ing situations, the courts are abdicating their responsibility to reform the common law to meet
evolving standards of justice); Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 514 (the genius of the common law
is the ability to adapt to the changing needs of society). See generally Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at
882, 395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847 (the courts should not abdicate responsibility for
the upkeep of the common law); Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 62-63, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07
(the development of the common law is determined by the needs of society).
272. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 121, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1968) (abandoning distinction between business invitee, social guest, and trespasser, with
regard to liability for conditions of the land); Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914,
69 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (mother received damages for emotional injury resulting from witnessing
an injury to a child); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 697-99, 376 P.2d 70, 72-73, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 102, 104-05 (1962) (abrogating rule of interspousal unity for negligent torts); Muskopf
v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218-19, 359 P.2d 457, 462-63, 11 Cal. Rptr. 98,
94-95 (1961) (abolition of sovereign immunity).
273. See Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 882-83, 395 P.2d at 895-97, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
274. See supra notes 253-73 and accompanying text (discussion of policy reasons for per-
mitting recovery for loss of parental consortium).
275. See supra notes 186-237 and accompanying text (discussion of how policy considera-
tions have evolved since Borer).
276. See supra notes 253-73 and accompanying text (discussion of policy support for loss
of parental consortium recovery). See also Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 453, 563 P.2d at 866, 138
Cal. Rptr. at 310 (court discussing policy reasons supporting recovery for loss of parental
consortium).
277. See Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 266-68; Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 694; see also Theama, 344
N.W.2d at 522.
278. See Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 694.
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Joinder of the loss of consortium action to the personal injury action
of the parent could be made mandatory. 2 9 Finally, any monetary
recovery by a minor for loss of consortium could be placed under
the control of a court appointed trustee.28 ° Consequently, the California
Supreme Court should review and ultimately overrule the Borer
decision.
CONCLUSION
Damages for loss of spousal consortium may be recovered in Califor-
nia. The extension of the loss of consortium theory to the parent-
child relationship would be logical and equitable. Children who lose
the society of a parent are psycologically damaged. These children
have greater difficulty becoming productive members of society than
other children. Although loss of parental consortium damages are
recovdabe in the context of a wrongful death action, recovery of
damages for loss of parental consortium in personal injury action is
not allowed under the rule of Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.
The Borer court applied a balancing test to determine whether the
action for loss of parental consortium should be permitted and con-
cluded that the detriments of permitting recovery outweighed the
benefits. As a result, recovery for loss of parental consortium was
denied. Because Borer was decided by a balancing of policy considera-
tions, any change in the weight given to those considerations would
call into question the present validity of the outcome of the balanc-
ing test. Recent expansions of tort remedies and changes in the way
society views children have altered the weight of the elements of the
balancing test applied in Borer.
The California court of appeal in Nix explored recent changes in
the law that have undermined Borer, and discussed the various reasons
given by the commentators and the other state supreme courts to sup-
port recovery for loss of parental consortium. As a result, the Nix
court questioned the current validity of Borer. In the nine years since
the Borer decision, other jurisdictions have permitted recovery for
loss of parental consortium. These decisions have underlined the great
importance of the interests of the child in the consortium of a parent.
These decisions also have recognized the logic of the dissent of Justice
Mosk in Borer. Children have been recognized as deserving the same
legal rights and remedies as adults. Psychological studies have shown
279. See id. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 266-68; Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 522.
280. See Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 266-68.
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that children deprived of their parents do not grow into well bal-
anced adults as easily as children with both parents. In addition,
recovery for intangible injuries has been permitted in California without
the prerequisite of a physical injury. Consequently, the Nix court was
compelled to question the continuing validity of Borer.
The Borer decision is not consistent with recent expansions in
California tort law. In addition, a growing recognition of the need
to adequately protect the parent-child relationship undermines the ma-
jor premise of the case. Accordingly, the Borer decision should be
overruled and children should be permitted to recover for loss of paren-
tal consortium in California.
Eric Ernest Ostling
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